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Problematic AI — When
Should We Use It?
May 17 Written By Fredric Lederer

One of the most interesting and important developments in the ongoing evolution of technological tools,
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a largely misunderstood, advertising-hyped technology that is already
changing our lives. Public reaction to AI use varies widely. To many, it’s simply the same as saying,
“produced or affected by computers.” To some, it’s a near magical technological innovation leading, for
example, to autonomous, “self-driving” vehicles. And to others, it suggests deadly killing machines —
“Killer-bots” that could supplant and destroy humanity.
Strictly speaking, according to Dr. Karl Branting of Mitre, “Artificial Intelligence” or AI can be described as
“the field that seeks technology capable of human-like reasoning, perception, and control.” Machine
learning is a form of AI that modifies its own programming as it “learns” via exposure to new data.
Accordingly, unless otherwise differentiated, my use of “Artificial Intelligence” or “AI” refers to forms of
machine learning. For machine learning to function correctly, the AI program software — the “algorithm”
— must be written correctly. Then, in most cases, it must be “trained.” Training means that the algorithm is
exposed to large amounts of accurately labeled data. AI permits computerized analysis of these vast
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amounts of data in order to discern potential causation — what facts or circumstances cause a given result.
With that determination, AI systems can identify patterns, make predictions, and, if so designed, implement
those predictions.
AI can vastly improve life. Consider the January 2022 traffic stoppage on Interstate 95, which trapped
drivers on the highway, in some cases for up to 24 hours, because of snow. One can imagine a future AI
system analyzing probable real world weather conditions, correlating them with available snow removal
resources and “known” data about how drivers react to past similar weather conditions, and then advising or
implementing a highway closure.
However, the nature of AI can also be problematic. No matter how it is expressed, the result of an AI data
analysis is probabilistic. No matter how certain an AI result seems, the answer is always a probability, one
that is dependent on data. Further, because AI modifies its own programming as it analyzes new data, we do
not always know why an AI reaches a given result. When algorithms are trained with or use incorrect or
biased data, the algorithm produces biased results. For example, thanks to bias and thus error, a number of
cities have banned facial recognition use for law enforcement. Technology companies using AI to select
good job candidates have discovered that using the resumes of current employees, mostly male, taught the
AI to select men.
Even though training an AI with inaccurate data is a major concern, If training were the only problem, we
likely could refine our process and produce accurate AI systems. However, the key to machine learning is
that the algorithm “learns” as it operates; it alters its own programming to correspond with the data it uses in
operation. If the algorithm is designed to encourage people to eat healthy foods, for example, and people
report to the algorithm (or post on social media that is “read” by the algorithm) that they are healthier by
eating fast food, the algorithm will recommend fast food unless its designers have written its programming
in a manner that prevents such a possibility. Access to the Internet permits the use of large amounts of data,
but often that data is inaccurate — at best. In 2016, an experimental Microsoft “Bot” designed to mimic a
teenage girl received access to Twitter. “Less than a day after she joined Twitter, Microsoft’s AI bot, Tay.ai,
was taken down for becoming a sexist, racist monster.” Gaining more than 50,000 followers, Tay.ai
mimicked “her” followers. Therefore, the use of technology to assist in decision-making or to make
important decisions without major human involvement has often been troublesome.
The question, then, is how society ought to deal with AI, a promising technology that at times is certain to
malfunction. There may be uses in which accuracy and avoiding harmful behavior are so important that we
must not tolerate any potential AI error. If there is a serious risk that an AI driven vehicle will “choose” to
run down humans, for example, we must not use AI for that purpose unless we can install adequate
safeguards.
Usually, those who are troubled by current or future AI use have two primary concerns. First, in some areas
AI decision-making should not be a substitute for fundamental decisions only humans should make. Second,
for most AI uses, the problem is that in light of how people behave, AI has a strong likelihood of yielding
erroneous results that will be assumed to be correct. Evolving ethical standards and algorithmic justice may
be useful; however, given the nature of AI, it’s not helpful to say, “Do no harm.”
We live in an imperfect world, one that contains many types of bias. The key problem in using AI
algorithms is that AI tends to reflect the real world’s bias. Given that our goal is — or ought to be —
making our world better, which is to say not just more efficient or less expensive to live in, but also fairer,
and more equitable, I believe the following three-part framework to examine AI’s usefulness can be of
value.
Will the proposed AI use most likely be no worse than current reasonable human analysis and
decision-making?
Does the proposed AI use reflect reasonable efforts to eliminate inaccuracy and bias?
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Is there a reasonable chance that if the AI use is allowed to evolve, it will become fairer and more
accurate than human efforts?
These recommendations embrace the classic cliché, “the perfect is the enemy of the good.” In dealing with
human decision-making, comparisons ought to be made using reality — the average, normal person —
rather than a near-mythical, all-knowing wise person who doesn’t exist.
Two AI uses that well illustrate my analytical framework are the use of AI to predict recidivism for pretrial
release and sentencing in criminal cases and the use of AI-controlled weaponry.
Predicting Future Criminal Misconduct
Sometimes, we need to determine the likelihood that a person will commit a crime. When persons are
arrested, they go before a judge or magistrate who must determine the conditions, if any, by which they can
be released while awaiting trial. In theory, absent a statute or court rule permitting preventive detention to
avoid likely future misconduct, the question should be what condition or combination of conditions will
ensure that the defendant will show up for trial. However, in addition to the numerous jurisdictions with
formal preventive detention procedures, most judges take into consideration the possibility that the accused
may commit another crime pending trial. This consideration can result in pretrial detention or sharply
increase the amount of bail, quite possibly to such a level that the accused cannot secure release. How does
a judge, who does not personally know the defendant, determine the likelihood that that person will commit
a crime before trial, especially a crime of violence? The same question faces a sentencing judge who must
determine what punishment to mete out after a defendant is convicted. If the judge is concerned that a
defendant is likely to reoffend, the judge may wish to impose a more severe sentence to protect the public.
A number of organizations now offer “Risk Assessment” tools — non-machine learning technology that is
intended to predict the likelihood of future criminal conduct. Originally intended to help with postincarceration release decision-making, this technology is now used in both pretrial release decisions and
sentencing. A judge or court official inputs basic data about the defendant, and the algorithm provides what
amounts to a probability score prediction of future crime. The technology does not make the actual pretrial
release or sentencing decision. The judge does that, but only after taking the AI prediction into
consideration.
The use of this technology was challenged in a well-known 2017 Wisconsin State Supreme Court case
involving sentencing, State v. Loomis. In Loomis, the defendant asserted, among other things, that his
sentence violated due process because the court employed a commercial technology product, COMPAS
(Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions), to predict his likely recidivism. As
the Court explained:
COMPAS is a risk-need assessment tool designed by Northpointe, Inc. to provide decisional support
for the Department of Corrections when making placement decisions, managing offenders, and
planning treatment. The COMPAS risk assessment is based upon information gathered from the
defendant's criminal file and an interview with the defendant.
A COMPAS report consists of a risk assessment designed to predict recidivism and a separate needs
assessment for identifying program needs in areas such as employment, housing and substance abuse.
The risk assessment portion of COMPAS generates risk scores displayed in the form of a bar chart,
with three bars that represent pretrial recidivism risk, general recidivism risk, and violent recidivism
risk. Each bar indicates a defendant's level of risk on a scale of one to ten.
As the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) explains, risk scores are intended to predict the general
likelihood that those with a similar history of offending are either less likely or more likely to commit
another crime following release from custody. However, the COMPAS risk assessment does not
predict the specific likelihood that an individual offender will reoffend. Instead, it provides a
prediction based on a comparison of information about the individual to a similar data group.
https://www.sir.advancedleadership.harvard.edu/articles/problematic-ai-when-should-we-use-it
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Loomis attacked the use of the COMPAS prediction on other grounds as well, including that he was not
allowed to inspect the computer code itself because COMPAS’ manufacturer, Northpointe, Inc., invoked the
trade secret privilege to keep it secret. The Court opined that “Although Loomis cannot review and
challenge how the COMPAS algorithm calculates risk, he can at least review and challenge the resulting
risk scores set forth in the report attached to the PSI.”
Ultimately, the Court sustained the use of the COMPAS risk assessment as a factor in determining a
sentence, but made it clear that it was doing so because the judge was responsible for making the actual
sentencing decision and the COMPAS assessment was only one factor the judge considered. The Court
expressly noted ProPublica’s analysis, which reported that COMPAS was racially biased:
A recent analysis of COMPAS's recidivism scores based upon data from 10,000 criminal defendants
in Broward County, Florida, concluded that black defendants "were far more likely than white
defendants to be incorrectly judged to be at a higher risk of recidivism." Likewise, white defendants
were more likely than black defendants to be incorrectly flagged as low risk. Although Northpointe
disputes this analysis, this study and others raise concerns regarding how a COMPAS assessment's
risk factors correlate with race. [The interested reader may wish to consult Mission and Scope ·
Harvard Data Science Review, which concludes that COMPAS was not racially biased but very
complicated in its structure.]
The Court opined that while any use of COMPAS would require the PSI to warn the user about concerns,
providing the sentencing court with more information than would be available without the COMPAS
assessment would still be helpful.
There are many criticisms of using risk assessment tools, not the least of which are that they are grouporiented and reflect past data. Moreover, those data fail to deal with the history and behavior of the specific
person involved. In addition, as many Americans rely heavily on technology, they may well give undue
weight to technological predictions, especially when they emanate from something called “Artificial
Intelligence.” This may be especially true as most lawyers and judges do not have technological
backgrounds.
Why then did the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reject the Loomis challenges? The key can be found in its
discussion of and preference for “evidence-based sentencing”:
It is helpful to consider Loomis's due process arguments in the broader context of the evolution of
evidence-based sentencing. Wisconsin has been at the forefront of advancing evidence-based
practices. In 2004, this court's Planning and Policy Advisory Committee (PPAC) created a
subcommittee "to explore and assess the effectiveness of policies and programs ... designed to
improve public safety and reduce incarceration."
From that initial charge, Wisconsin's commitment to evidence-based practices and its leadership role
have been well documented. Initially, a variety of risk and needs assessment tools were used by
various jurisdictions within the state. In 2012, however, the Wisconsin Department of Corrections
selected COMPAS as the statewide assessment tool for its correctional officers, providing assessment
of risk probability for pretrial release misconduct and general recidivism.
In [the prior Wisconsin Court of Appeals case] Gallion we warned of ad hoc decision making at
sentencing: "Experience has taught us to be cautious when reaching high consequence conclusions
about human nature that seem to be intuitively correct at the moment. Better instead is a conclusion
that is based on more complete and accurate information..." We encouraged circuit courts to seek
"more complete information upfront, at the time of sentencing. Judges would be assisted in knowing
about a defendant's propensity for causing harm [and] the circumstances likely to precipitate the
harm..."
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Concern about ad hoc decision making is justified. A myriad of determinations are made throughout
the criminal justice system without consideration of tested facts of any kind. Questions such as
whether to require treatment, if so what kind, and how long supervision should last often have been
left to a judge's intuition or a correctional officer's standard practice.
Sentencing has long been recognized as a fundamental problem in criminal law and justice. Judges make
important decisions with inadequate data. Judges are rarely provided with clear cut sentencing goals. When
they formally exist, they usually are not ranked by priority of importance. In the absence of a statutory or
rule requirement, it becomes inherently difficult, if not plainly impossible, to say what the “right” sentence
is. Interestingly, in the allied area of pretrial release, the National Center for State Courts has reported:
In an exhaustive analysis of a nationally representative sample of over 70,000 felony defendants on
pretrial release from the seventy-five largest counties in the U.S. between 1990 and 2006, researchers
found that historically judges have often released and detained the wrong people. Half of those
detained had less than a 20% chance of re-arrest while an equivalent number of those released had a
greater likelihood of committing a crime.
Inconsistent and arbitrary sentencing is commonplace. Disparity in sentencing by race is well recognized. It
is not unusual for co-actors tried separately to receive highly inconsistent sentences in civilian courts. In a
major effort to ameliorate the problem, Congress created the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which
attempted to provide some degree of consistent sentencing in the federal courts. In 2005, the Supreme Court
held that they were not binding in United States v. Booker.
In most cases, judges need not explain their sentencing decisions. We have made progress in that legally and
now culturally, we recognize that offenders should not have their sentences determined in whole or in part
by race, ethnic background, religion, and the like — although we still have disparate sentencing in that
regard.
In short, human decision-making in sentencing is inadequate. It is arbitrary, sometimes capricious. Often it
defies explanation or adequate justification. Furthermore, this has been problematic for centuries. What of
AI risk assessments? Of course, the COMPAS risk assessment used in Loomis was only one part of the
sentencing data the judge used. Although human beings have changed little when it comes to sentencing,
technology holds the promise of improvement. Its rapid pace of development is obvious. Today’s
“telephone” represents an example; smart phones have become data hubs, health monitors, communication
centers, the source of personal videoconferencing, audio-video communications, and more. Had the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the deficiencies in COMPAS violate due process, it likely would have
signaled to commercial concerns that further development work would have been unwarranted financially.
In light of its holding, along with those of other courts, companies can now continue working to improve
their products notwithstanding the clear deficiencies in the current technology. There is a reasonable chance
that eventually AI will prove superior to human judgment. When AI risk assessment, deeply flawed as it is,
is compared with human behavior, it may not be so bad after all. More importantly, it probably will improve
with time, while human ability appears to be largely fixed. This presupposes that the nature of risk
assessments remains unchanged. It could be that augmented assessments could be used to help judges
recognize their own biases and information shortcomings.
Applying the proposed AI uses framework to recidivism, we could conclude that:
Will the proposed AI use most likely be no worse than current reasonable human analysis and
decision-making?
Especially in light of what is understood about the limitations of AI risk assessments, courts that
allow judges to use them but not completely defer to them are no worse than unaided human decisionmaking.
Does the proposed AI use reflect reasonable efforts to eliminate inaccuracy and bias?
https://www.sir.advancedleadership.harvard.edu/articles/problematic-ai-when-should-we-use-it
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The limitations of technological risk assessments have been discussed extensively in both scholarly
and public literature, and it would appear that work to improve the risk assessments is ongoing.
Is there a reasonable chance that if the AI use is allowed to evolve, it will become fairer and more
accurate than human efforts?
Given the nature of technological change, there is a reasonable probability that AI risk assessments
will improve. The field is an evolving science.
This proposed AI use framework supports the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Loomis, albeit in a
more nuanced fashion.
Autonomous Weapons Systems
Modern warfare is lethal and fast. An attack can be launched with such surprise that notice, if any, is only a
matter of minutes. Accordingly, there is great interest in potentially autonomous weapon systems that can
remain ready for long periods, whether attended by people or not, and can react instantly when necessary.
The fundamental moral objections to AI-controlled weapons are that machines ought not to “decide” to take
a life, and that such weapons would inspire a new arms race. Rather, humans should either make the
decision to fire or at least be “on the loop” and able to make the decision to withhold that permission from
an autonomous weapon system. [Note on terminology: “on the loop” is different from “in the loop”; “in the
loop” requires human decision-making while “on the loop” permits a human to stop the weapon.]
Setting aside the moral question, however, there often appears to be an assumption, stated or otherwise, that
human judgment is possible on the modern battlefield and that our judgment is better than machine
judgment. That assumption can be fallacious for two reasons: the nature of the modern high-tech battlefield
in which decisions must be made faster than humans are capable of and the inherent fallibility of human
decision makers, especially in combat.
Commendable efforts to constrain warfare have been with us for a long time and form the basis of the
Geneva Accords, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and the Geneva Protocol. Over the centuries,
moral objections have been raised to various types of weapons. Gunpowder permitted killing at a great
distance. Some claimed that was immoral because it removed the risk of harm from the target who
otherwise would have to be personally faced. More recently, we have questioned the ethics of using nuclear
weapons, “dumb” mines, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
Setting aside the moral issues surrounding war and weapons, objections to AI-controlled weaponry center
on out-of-control weapons and the possibility that AI-controlled weapons systems could make decisions that
harm or kill the wrong people. AI “Killer-bots” embody the fear personified in science fiction stories by
Fred Saberhagen of AI “Berserker” starships that seek to destroy all life throughout the galaxy. Given that
machines can malfunction, the need to be able to deactivate a weapons system seems obvious. The more
difficult question is the degree to which, if at all, a human should have to authorize the operation of an AI
weapon so that it cannot fire at a specific target without a real person’s approval. Although it appears that
the U.S. does not now have “lethal autonomous weapons systems,” current U.S. policy does not require
such human involvement, the requirement for a “human in the loop.”
Modern warfare often is too fast for human judgment. Technology has enabled massive enemy attacks to be
undetectable until the last minute. Defending against them is difficult. One response to this problem is the
Phalanx CIWS Weapon System. As its manufacturer, Raytheon Missiles and Defense, defines it, the U.S.
Navy Phalanx CIWS Weapon System “is a rapid-fire, computer-controlled, radar-guided gun that can defeat
anti-ship missiles and other close-in threats on land and at sea.” The system is:
a fast-reaction, rapid-fire 20-millimeter gun system that provides U.S. Navy ships with a terminal
defense against anti-ship missiles that have penetrated other fleet defenses. Designed to engage antiship cruise missiles and fixed-wing aircraft at short range, Phalanx automatically engages functions
usually performed by separate, independent systems such as search, detection, threat evaluation,
https://www.sir.advancedleadership.harvard.edu/articles/problematic-ai-when-should-we-use-it
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acquisition, track, firing, target destruction, kill assessment and cease fire... [The weapon fires] at
either 3,000 or 4,500 rounds-per-minute...
Although a human being must turn on the system, it is otherwise automatic insofar as target engagement is
concerned.
In addition to the need to choose targets in speed and data overload circumstances, technology often is used
to compensate for inadequate troop strength and inadequate human decision-making. Consider “dumb”
landmines. Placed on or under the ground to deny enemy access to large areas, mines detonate when a
person steps on them, pulls a tripwire, or engages a similar device. Landmines not only kill innocent noncombatants during war but also often continue to be fatal risks for years after a war ends. Despite continuing
protest, we use landmines largely because we don’t have enough personnel to replace them. What about
using AI systems to decide whether to fire a mine?
As of 2015, Samsung had manufactured the Samsung SGR-AI, which was installed in the Korean
demilitarized zone. The system is a technological sentry that not only detects targets up to two miles away
but also can function automatically using its own target detection system. Why might we want to use such a
device in an automatic mode? Clausewitz is credited with the expression the “fog of war,” the difficulty of
knowing what is really happening in combat. If we were to use only human beings to decide whether to fire
a weapon, who makes the fire/no fire decision? Unless we use the system now used for remote drone
operations with drone pilots potentially thousands of miles away from the target, that person is likely to be
an on-the-spot exhausted soldier or Marine with limited information trying to cope with numerous
immediate requirements. How good will that person’s decision be compared with a device that never gets
tired, hungry, or distracted, and which has been programmed not to fire at what appears to be children or
other non-combatants?
What of the remote drone pilots then? They are often stressed human beings with all that brings. They too
make errors. The Defense Department has declared that the August 29, 2021 Kabul drone strike “killed 10
civilians, including an aid worker and seven children” despite the fact that the drone and its operator tracked
the vehicle involved for hours.
If we compare AI-based weapons systems with human decision-making, it becomes apparent that AI
systems may be able to function properly when human beings can’t. Properly programmed with law of war
constraints, AI systems may produce more lawful results than human military personnel can. That AI
systems may err is clear. But we must compare that error to the probable human error. For an interesting
discussion of this general topic see Mackenzie Patrick Eason, Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems:
Reconciling the Myth of Killer Robots and the Reality of the Modern Battlefield.
Returning to my proposed AI use framework and applying them to possible AI weapons systems:
Will the proposed AI use likely be no worse than current reasonable human analysis and decisionmaking?
Human-controlled weapons system decisions are likely to be made by fallible people with inadequate
information in circumstances in which their reasoning ability is adversely affected by combat
conditions, inadequate information, and insufficient time — constraints less likely to apply to AI
systems.
Does the proposed AI use reflect reasonable efforts to eliminate inaccuracy and bias?
Yes. At least in the U.S., we make weapons systems that are intended to comply with law and
practical, including political, needs.
Is there a reasonable chance that if the AI use is allowed to evolve, it will become fairer and more
accurate than human efforts are?
In light of the increasing analytical ability of AI systems and the ability to make faster-than-human
decisions evaluating more data than a person can evaluate, the answer is “yes.”
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Conclusion
AI holds immense promise to improve our lives. Yet, we can predict that for at least the near and likelymidterm future, AI products will continue to be imperfect, sometimes in distressing ways. We can reject AI
use, either by legal or political prohibition, or we can use artificial intelligence with suitable caution,
safeguards, and understanding. Our policy should favor the latter option. It would be wrong to decide that
human error and bias are pragmatically acceptable and reject technological help that might make society
function in a fairer, more equitable, and generally better way. It is clear that AI may be so imperfect and so
harmful to individuals or groups, especially when used by imperfect and possibly biased people, that we
ought not to tolerate such harm. But, in deciding whether to tolerate a given amount of error and harm, we
should ask whether AI holds sufficient promise for a better future at a cost equal to or less than current
human decision-making. If so, we should tolerate that price.
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